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order effective August 12, 2000, through September 30, 2000, which
prohibited the irrigation of crops from the Deadman's Basin
Reservoir.
The district court's order contradicted the pro rata reduction in
water distribution set forth in section one of the Deadman's Basin
water purchase contract, and prevented Micks from irrigating his hay
crop. Micks continued to irrigate his hay crop with the reservoir water,
and the district court found Micks to be in violation of the order.
Micks moved the court to reconsider its August 2, 2000 order, issue a
temporary restraining order, and issue a preliminary injunction. The
district court denied the motion, and Micks appealed to the Supreme
Court of Montana. On appeal, the decision was reversed and
remanded.
Micks set forth two arguments to show why the August 2, 2000
order did not apply to him. First, he maintained that the water he
used to irrigate his crop came from a system that was not connected to
the Musselshell River. Second, Micks argued that the right to the
Reservoir water should not be appropriated to the municipality to his
detriment.
The district court's order contravened the terms in section one of
the water purchase contract. The Supreme Court of Montana found
that the district court erred when it made the determination that
domestic appropriation of the Reservoir water was a higher priority
than Micks' use for irrigation purposes. Because language of
contractual provisions should be interpreted according to its plain,
ordinary meaning, and because the language in section one of the
water purchase contract is unambiguous regarding the outstanding
distribution of water in the event there is an insufficient supply in the
Reservoir, the district court was bound to those terms as written.
Melissa L. Gordon
NEBRASKA
Jurgensmier Farms, Inc. v. Kearney Cty., No. A-00-564, 2001 WL
968062 (Neb. App. Aug. 28, 2001) (granting injunctive relief and
damages resulting from Kearney County wrongfully blocking a natural
drainageway by raising a county road).
Jurgensmier Farms, Inc. ('jurgensmier") brought this case on
appeal from a district court decision denying injunctive relief and
damages against Kearney County ("County"). Jurgensmier purchased
land ("property") for farming in 1967. In 1979, the county decided to
raise the county road that bordered the Jurgensmier Farm to the east.
At that time, Jurgensmier expressed concern that the raising of the
road would impede the natural drainage from the property.
After the county raised the road, Jurgensmier experienced water
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backing up in the Southeast corner of the property. Jurgensmier
attempted to have the county install a culvert to drain the excess water,
but the county refused. Jurgensmier then attempted to remove the
excess water by pumping the water through an irrigation line placed
over the road to adjacent lands. The county informed Jurgensmier to
cease this pumping and remove the line. Jurgensmier then asked the
County to bury the line, which the County refused to do.
Jurgensmier once again appealed to the County to install the
culvert before filing its complaint on November 20, 1997. The
complaint sought injunctive relief and damages from the county for
wrongfully blocking the drainageway from the Jurgensmier property,
which created a nuisance, loss of land use, and damage to crops. The
district court of Kearney Country held trial on December 1, 1999 and
entered a judgment for the county by finding Jurgensmier did not
meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that a
drainageway transversed the road before the road was altered, that a
drainageway formed and exited the property in a natural way, that the
drainageway carried water from a higher to a lower estate, and that the
County obstructed this drainageway.
Jurgensmier appealed this decision to the Nebraska Court of
Appeals claiming the district court erred in finding Jurgensmier was
not entitled to injunctive relief and damages as a result of the County's
interference with a natural drainageway, and by overruling its
rehearing request.
The court of appeals determined Jurgensmier had the burden to
establish every controverted fact necessary to entitle them to relief.
Additionally, the court of appeals determined an action for injunction
sounds in equity, and equity actions are de novo proceedings in front of
the court of appeals.
The court of appeals relied on Cruberv. County of Dawson in their
analysis of the district court's ruling. The analysis consisted of a test
through which it must be established that: (1) a natural drainageway
exists; (2) the natural drainageway traversed the road before the
alteration; and (3) the natural drainageway was obstructed because of
the road alteration. The court of appeals determined a natural
drainageway occurred in the present case as defined as diffused water
that concentrates and gathers in volume thereby losing its diffused
character and then flowing into a well-defined course. Undisputed
evidence determined the water was diffused water (defined as water
that appears on the surface with no permanent source or supply,
typically resulting from rainfall or snow melting) that flowed off the
Additionally, the court of appeals
property to the southeast.
determined Jurgensmier, through preponderance of the evidence,
established this natural drainageway existed before the alteration of
the road. Finally, the court determined the county has a duty to keep
a natural drainageway open, and, due to the road alteration, failed this
duty, causing obstructing to theJurgensmier's detriment.
The court of appeals concluded the district court erred in denying
the injunctive relief Jurgensmier sought, and remanded the case back
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to the district court with directions. As a result, the court of appeals
did not address Jurgensmier's second issue regarding the district
court's alleged error in overrulingJurgensmier motion for a new trial.
William H. Fronczak
City of Lincoln v. Cent. Platte Natural Res. Dist., 638 N.W.2d 839
(Neb. 2002) (holding that the Department of Natural Resources'
decision to deny Saunders County the right to become a party to the
City of Lincoln's application to appropriate flows of the Platte River
was proper based upon the Department's factual determinations, and
that those factual determinations were not arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable).
The City of Lincoln sought to appropriate flows from the Platte
River for groundwater recharge.
An application for such
appropriation was made to the Department of Natural Resources in
September of 1993. Notice was published, which specified a deadline
of August of 1994 for filing objections. Several timely objections were
filed. These resulted in two compromises, which amended the
application by reducing the amount of stream flow requested. In
1999, more than five years after the deadline had passed, Saunders
County filed an objection. This action necessitated a hearing to
determine whether Saunders County could still become a party to the
application.
The Department of Natural Resources held that Saunders County
had failed to prove: (1) that it had a sufficient interest in the subject
matter to become a party; (2) that its participation would be helpful in
rendering a decision; and (3) that its participation at the time of filing
would not unduly disrupt or delay the proceedings. Noting that any
one of these failures alone would be a sufficient reason to deny
Saunders County's request, the Department of Natural Resources
refused to allow Saunders County to become a party to the action.
Saunders County appealed.
Appellate review of the factual determinations of the Department
of Natural Resources is limited to situations where those
determinations are arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. The court
held that this high standard of review had not been met in the instant
case. Ample evidence had been presented for the Department to
reasonably reach the conclusions it did, and the absence of certain
evidence (including drafts of the hearing officer's findings) was not
sufficient to make the Department's findings of fact arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. The court then held that given these
findings of fact, denying Saunders County's request was an appropriate
application of the law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the holding of
the Department of Natural Resources.
James Siegesmund

